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IN RE LIPITOR ANTITRUST LITIGATION : THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S
PRESCRIPTION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEWABILITY OF
REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
JOHN MIRAGLIA*
“My shareholders expect me to make the most profit . . .
that’s the ugly, dirty truth.”1
I. DIAGNOSING THE REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENT PHENOMENON
While delivering his first State of the Union address, President Don-
ald J. Trump noted that “the FDA approved more new and generic
drugs . . . than ever before in our history.”2  President Trump cited this
fact in support of his proposition that access to “affordable generic drugs”
is apparently on the rise.3  Unfortunately, when the FDA approves a ge-
neric drug, there is no guarantee that the drug will make it to the market
in a timely fashion.4  Often, when generic drugs are approved, a brand-
name manufacturer will sue the generic manufacturer for patent infringe-
ment.5  Put simply, these suits often result in the delayed entry of the ge-
neric drug because of a unique type of inter-party settlement, a “reverse
payment” settlement.6
A reverse payment settlement occurs when a brand-name drug manu-
facturer essentially pays off a generic drug manufacturer that is challeng-
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., Philosophy, 2016, Haverford College.
1. Dan Diamond, Martin Shkreli Admits He Messed Up: He Should’ve Raised Prices
Even Higher, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dandiamond/
2015/12/03/what-martin-shkreli-says-now-i-shouldve-raised-prices-higher/#2ccc4a
bf1362 [https://perma.cc/6NHV-F7G2].  This is a quote from Martin Shkreli, the
man who was infamously behind a number of notorious pharmaceutical drug price
increases; most notably, he was responsible for raising the price of the AIDs drug,
Daraprim, over 5000%. See id. (discussing Shkreli’s notoriety).
2. State of the Union 2018: Read the full transcript, CNN POLITICS, available
at https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/30/politics/2018-state-of-the-union-transcript/
index.html [https://perma.cc/28YH-RT6Q] (last updated Jan. 31, 2018).
3. See id. (noting that approval was aimed at “speed[ing] access to break-
through cures and affordable generic drugs”).
4. See infra notes 28–36 and accompanying text (outlining how FDA approval
of generic drugs may ultimately lead to reverse payment settlements delaying ge-
neric drug’s entry into market).
5. See infra notes 28–33 and accompanying text (describing how paragraph IV
approval leads to litigation).
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ing the validity of the brand-name manufacturer’s patent(s).7  This reverse
payment is beneficial for both parties; the generic manufacturer gets a
payday, and the brand-name manufacturer gets to maintain its monopoly.8
Of course, the foregoing explanation is quite reductionist, but it gets at
the problematic aspect of reverse payment settlements—they can be an-
ticompetitive.9  It is this potentially anticompetitive characteristic of re-
verse payment settlements that has spawned a great deal of litigation.10
A number of plaintiffs have contended that reverse payment settle-
ments violate antitrust laws because they are anticompetitive.11  Irrespec-
tive of whether a reverse payment settlement actually violates antitrust laws,
a crucial issue is whether (and when) a reverse payment settlement is even
judicially reviewable for an antitrust violation.12  This issue—the reviewabil-
7. See Joshua B. Fischman, The Circular Logic of Actavis, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 91, 95
(2016) (outlining the basic nature of reverse payment settlements).  The Supreme
Court has also provided a useful and concise summary of reverse payment
settlements:
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement.  The two compa-
nies settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed in-
fringer, not to produce the patented product until the patent’s term
expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of
dollars.  Because the settlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged
infringer, rather than the other way around, this kind of settlement
agreement is often called a “reverse payment” settlement agreement.
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 140–41; see also In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 233 F. Supp. 3d 247,
256 (D. Mass. 2017) (citing Actavis, 570 U.S. at 140–41) (“An anticompetitive re-
verse payment occurs when a brand-name manufacturer . . . induces a potential
generic rival to delay or abandon its challenges to the patent and its entry into the
market by providing some form of compensation”) (emphasis added).
8. See Fischman, supra note 7, at 94–95 (“This arrangement allows the patent
owner to continue earning monopoly profits . . . [and] the patent holder shares its
monopoly profits with the generic by making what is known as a ‘reverse payment’
to the generic firm.”).  Many commentators outside the legal field have similarly
weighed in on the importance of discouraging monopolistic behavior in the phar-
maceutical drug industry. See, e.g., Sydney Lupkin, 5 Reasons Prescription Drug Prices
Are So High in the U.S., MONEY (August 23, 2016), http://time.com/money/
4462919/prescription-drug-prices-too-high/ [https://perma.cc/A7DR-HJ4D]
(noting that regulatory system in U.S. confers legally protected monopolistic rights
and allows brand-name manufacturers to set their own prices).
9. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 148–49 (reasoning that settlement agreements can
violate antitrust laws by being anticompetitive); see also In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig.,
868 F.3d 231, 250–51 (3d Cir. 2017) (interpreting Actavis and outlining features of
reverse payment settlements that may discourage competition), cert. denied, 200 L.
Ed. 2d 300 (2018).
10. See infra notes 60–70 and accompanying text (discussing reverse payment
settlement jurisprudence).
11. See, e.g., In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 231,
239–40 (D. Mass. 2014) (summarizing procedural posture of class action challeng-
ing reverse payment settlement as anticompetitive under the Sherman Act); see also
Jennifer E. Sturiale, Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation and Inter Parties Review: A New
Sort of Competition, 69 ALA. L. REV. 59, 62–63 (2017) (noting trend of “chal-
leng[ing] . . . [reverse payment] settlements as anticompetitive”).
12. See infra notes 40–42, 54–70 and accompanying text (discussing judicial
reviewability).
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ity of reverse payment settlements—is a hotbed of judicial disagreement,
especially after the Third Circuit’s recent decision: In re Lipitor Antitrust
Litigation.13
In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation is significant because it touches on the
reviewability of reverse payment settlements as potential antitrust viola-
tions.14  The ostensibly plaintiff-friendly stance adopted by the Third Cir-
cuit has tremendous consequences for practitioners, as it may promote
judicial review of reverse payment settlements.15  A closer look at this deci-
sion informs how settling parties may be able to structure these settle-
ments to avoid such review.16  Specifically, Lipitor is the latest in a series of
decisions attempting to discourage brand-name manufacturers from delay-
ing their generic competitors’ entry, as part of complex reverse payment
settlements.17
In order to unpack the merits and implications of the Third Circuit’s
decision, Part II of this Casebrief will examine the statutory framework
that underlies and motivates reverse payment settlements.18  Part III ana-
lyzes the relevant case law leading up to the Third Circuit’s decision.19
Part IV discusses the facts of the case, and Part V analyzes the court’s rea-
soning.20  Part VI provides some practical insights regarding how this deci-
sion will affect both pharmaceutical companies and lawyers.21
13. 868 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2017).  This Casebrief will focus exclusively on the
Lipitor plaintiffs and defendants, and it will not discuss the claims stemming from
Effexor XR, on which the Third Circuit also ruled. See id. at 239 (summarizing
Third Circuit’s holding as it applied to complaints in both Lipitor and Effexor
litigation).  The timeliness of this issue is also evinced by the recent explosion in
the popularity of reverse payment settlements. See Raymond J. Prince, Note, Pay-
for-Delay: How Brand-Name and Generic Pharmaceutical Drug Companies Collude and Cost
Consumers Billions, 68 S.C. L. REV. 689, 691–92 (2017) (noting recent trend in re-
verse payment settlement popularity).
14. See generally In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2017); see
also infra notes 90–108 and accompanying text (providing narrative analysis of
Lipitor).
15. See infra notes 109–19 and accompanying text (highlighting promotion of
judicial reviewability).
16. See infra notes 108–09 and accompanying text (discussing how to avoid
judicial review).
17. See infra notes 60–70 and accompanying text (detailing other cases dis-
couraging reverse payment settlements).
18. See infra notes 22–33 and accompanying text (discussing Hatch-Waxman
Act framework).
19. See infra notes 34–70 and accompanying text (highlighting relevant case
law).
20. See infra notes 71–122 and accompanying text (providing narrative and
critical analyses of Lipitor).
21. See infra notes 123–35 and accompanying text (forecasting potential im-
pact of Lipitor).
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II. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK UNDER THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
Reverse payment settlements are a statutory creation, of sorts, because
they are a byproduct of the procedures set out in the Hatch-Waxman Act,
a complex nest of regulations setting out the approval processes for both
brand-name and generic drugs.22  Put simply, the act aims to ensure
proper testing of pharmaceutical drugs as well as stimulate competition
within the pharmaceutical marketplace.23  To meet these legislative ends,
the act establishes a framework that encourages generic manufacturers to
challenge the validity of brand-name manufacturers’ patents.24
The act also contains a mechanism encouraging reverse payment set-
tlements that is important to consider before delving into the statutory
approval processes; that mechanism is known as the exclusivity period.25
When a generic manufacturer successfully challenges and defeats a brand-
name patent, the generic and brand-name manufacturers enjoy an exclu-
sive 180-day period during which no other manufacturer may compete;
without this exclusivity period, other generic manufacturers could enter
the market and sell generic versions of the brand-name drug because it no
longer enjoys patent protection.26  However, before any exclusivity period
may be granted, a generic manufacturer must first obtain FDA approval
for a brand-name equivalent.27
A generic manufacturer may obtain FDA approval for the generic
equivalent of existing brand-name drugs, which have already been ap-
22. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (outlining the procedures to which phar-
maceutical companies must adhere to obtain FDA approval); see also Joseph Field-
ing, Note, From Pay-for-Delay to Product Hopping: The Limited Utility of Antitrust Law in
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1915, 1922–27 (2017)  (outlining
regulatory procedures set out by Hatch-Waxman Act).
23. See Sturiale, supra note 11, at 62–63 (outlining aims of the Hatch-Waxman
Act); see also Fielding, supra note 22, at 1918 (regarding Hatch-Waxman Act as
“attempt to balance” tension between too much and too little generic
competition).
24. See In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231, 240–41 (3d Cir. 2017) (out-
lining framework established by Hatch-Waxman Act); see also F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc.,
570 US. 136, 142–44 (2013) (discussing approval process).
25. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2018) (granting 180-day exclusivity
period to first applicant that successfully challenges patent of brand-name
manufacturer).
26. See id. (granting 180-day exclusivity period); see also Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 241
(outlining benefits of obtaining exclusivity period); Sturiale, supra note 11, at 63
(“If the first filer is successful in securing a determination that the patent claims
are invalid or not infringed, the first filer is entitled to 180 days of exclusive compe-
tition with the brand-name drug manufacturer . . . [and] no other generic drug
manufacturer seeking FDA approval on similar grounds may enter the market.”).
27. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 142 (“[O]nce the FDA has approved a brand-name
drug for marketing, a manufacturer of a generic drug can obtain similar market-
ing approval through [the] use of abbreviated procedures.”).
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proved through a lengthy testing process.28  To do so, a generic manufac-
turer must submit an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA); an
ANDA allows the generic manufacturer to obtain approval by demonstrat-
ing the “generic drug has the same active ingredients as, and is biologically
equivalent to, the brand-name drug.”29  A specific type of ANDA approval,
known as “paragraph IV certification,” includes an assertion by the generic
manufacturer that the drug either does not infringe a relevant patent, or,
alternatively, that any infringed patent is invalid.30  Because paragraph IV
certification necessarily challenges the validity of a brand-name manufac-
turer’s patent(s), it often incites the litigation that leads to reverse pay-
ment settlements.31  Thus, reverse payment settlements may be
characterized as a byproduct of the statutory framework established by the
Hatch-Waxman Act.32  The act incentivizes generic manufacturers to chal-
lenge weak brand-name patents by granting successful challengers a lucra-
tive exclusivity period, and the brand-name manufacturers evade
successful challenges by entering into reverse payment settlements.33
III. ANTITRUST SCRUTINY OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
UNDER F.T.C. V. ACTAVIS
To resolve paragraph IV litigation, brand-name and generic manufac-
turers often enter into reverse payment settlements.34  Whereas typical set-
tlements involve a payment tendered to the plaintiff, reverse payment
settlements involve a payment by the brand-name manufacturer, which is
28. See Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 240 (discussing the process by which generic manu-
facturers may obtain FDA approval that is parasitic upon approval of brand-name
drug).
29. Id. (quoting Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399,
405 (2012) (outlining ANDA approval process)).
30. Id. at 241 (citing Actavis, 570 U.S. at 142–43) (holding that reverse pay-
ment settlement agreements are subject to antitrust scrutiny).  This type of certifi-
cation is named after a provision in the act, which specifies that a generic
manufacturer can obtain ANDA certification on the grounds that the brand-name
manufacturer’s “patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use,
or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted.” Id. at 240–41
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)).  This process is also facilitated by the pub-
lication of patent information in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations, which is commonly known as the “Orange Book.” Id. at
240 (citing Caraco, 566 U.S. at 405–06).  After obtaining NDA approval, brand-
name manufacturers must “list any patents issued relating to the drug’s composi-
tion or methods of use” for publication in the Orange Book. Lipitor, 855 F.3d at
135.
31. See Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 241 (noting that “paragraph IV certification often
‘means provoking litigation’ instituted by the brand manufacturer”) (quoting
Caraco, 566 U.S. at 407).
32. Fielding, supra note 22, at 1922-27.
33. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text (discussing statutory ap-
proval process and profits associated with exclusivity period).
34. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 140-41 (noting origin of reverse payment
settlements).
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alleging patent infringement, to the generic manufacturer(s).35  In return
for this payment, generics agree to both delay their entry into the market
and render some ancillary services to the brand-name manufacturer.36
A number of class actions have alleged, to varying degrees of success,
that reverse payment settlements are actually aimed at delaying the entry
of generic competitors into the marketplace.37  Under this view, these
agreements are violative of Section I of the Sherman Act, which pros-
cribes, inter alia, agreements that restrain interstate commerce.38  Before
the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in F.T.C. v. Actavis Inc., a number
of courts eschewed judicial review of reverse payment settlements, reason-
ing that the brand-name manufacturer’s patent conferred a bundle of
rights, which were necessarily anticompetitive, at least to a certain
extent.39
In Actavis, the Court announced that reverse payment settlements
may be subject to judicial review when they are “large and unjustified.”40
Nevertheless, the lower courts remain divided as to exactly what character-
istics make a reverse payment large and unjustified.41  Despite this inter-
35. See id. at 152 (“In reverse payment settlements . . . a party with no claim
for damages (something that is usually true of a paragraph IV litigation defendant)
walks away with money simply so it will stay away from the patentee’s market.”).
36. See, e.g., King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
791 F.3d 388, 397-98 (3d Cir. 2015) (describing terms of reverse payment settle-
ment involving delayed market entry), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016)).
37. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text (outlining relevant cases chal-
lenging reverse payment settlements as anticompetitive).
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States . . . is hereby declared to be illegal.”).  Reverse payment settlements may also
violate Section II of the Sherman Act because they tend to further monopolies
held by brand-name manufacturers. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (not-
ing potentially anticompetitive nature of reverse payment settlements).
39. See In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231, 250 (3d Cir. 2018) (detail-
ing jurisprudence).  Settlement agreements were essentially “immune from anti-
trust scrutiny so long as the asserted anticompetitive effects fell within the scope of
the patent.” Id. (quoting King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 399 (discussing pre-Actavis
approach to settlement agreements).  Additionally, there is “a general legal policy
favoring the settlement of disputes.” Actavis, 570 U.S. at 154 (citing F.T.C. v. Wat-
son Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1313–14 (11th Cir. 2012)); see also United States
v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 485 (1926) (“[U]nder the patent law the
patentee is given by statute a monopoly of making, using and selling the patented
article.”).
40. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 158 (summarizing holding).
41. See id. (outlining scenario which leads to reverse payment settlements); see
also Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 9 (2014) [herein-
after Payment After Actavis] (“There is no dispute that settlements in which a brand
pays cash to a generic for delayed entry constitute payment.  But beyond this scena-
rio, opinions diverge.”).  Carrier’s article is aimed at “articulating a framework for
determining what constitutes an ‘exclusion payment’ that violates the antitrust
laws.” Id.; Michael A. Carrier, How Not to Apply Actavis, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE
113, 113 (2014) [hereinafter How Not to Apply Activis] (regarding Actavis decision
as “one of the most important business cases in the past generation”).
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pretive discord, Actavis remains the guidepost for courts determining the
reviewability of reverse payment settlements for potential antitrust
violations.42
A. F.T.C v. Actavis: The Supreme Court Subjects Large and Unjustified
Reverse Payment Settlements to Judicial Review
The facts and circumstances leading up to Actavis began when a
brand-name manufacturer, Solvay Pharmaceuticals, received approval for
its new pharmaceutical drug, Androgel.43  In addition to obtaining FDA
approval, Solvay also acquired and published patent protection for its
product.44  Thereafter, two generic manufacturers sought paragraph IV
certification for generic drugs “modeled after AndroGel.”45  In response
to these ANDA applications, Solvay sued the generic manufacturers for
patent infringement pursuant to the procedures laid out in the Hatch-
Waxman Act.46  Although Actavis ultimately obtained paragraph IV ap-
proval, the parties engaged in a settlement agreement.47
The settlement agreement included multi-million-dollar payments to
each of the generic companies, purportedly in return “for other services
the generics promised to perform.”48  Nevertheless, the FTC contended
42. See Carrier, Payment After Actavis, supra note 41, at 8–9 (noting importance
of Actavis and disagreement as to its application).
43. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 136 (discussing facts).
44. See id. at 144 (citing F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1308
(11th Cir. 2012)) (noting that patent disclosure is mandated by  Hatch-Waxman
Act).
45. See id. (discussing facts).  Specifically, Actavis, Inc. and Paddock Laborato-
ries both filed ANDAs. See id.  A third generic manufacturer, Par, was also a party
to the litigation and subsequent settlement, but Par “did not file an application of
its own but joined forces with Paddock, agreeing to share the patent litigation costs
in return for a share of profits if Paddock obtained approval for its generic drug.”
Id. at 144–45.
46. See id. at 145 (detailing inception of case).  In addition to motivating com-
petition by providing for a 180-day exclusivity period, the Hatch-Waxman Act pro-
vides a window in which the brand-name manufacturer can forestall approval of a
generic equivalent by bringing suit for patent infringement. See 21 U.S.C. § 355
(j)(5)(B)(iii) (noting that FDA approval for ANDA is effective unless “a[ ] [timely]
action is brought for infringement of the patent that is the subject of the
certification”).
47. See id. (discussing facts).
48. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 145.  These other services included Actavis “agree[ing]
to promote AndroGel to urologists.  The other generic manufacturers made
roughly similar promises.” Id.  Carrier provides a comprehensive list, including the
abovementioned promotion, of “unrelated generic services” which might provide a
legitimate justification for a large payment:
[T]he brand could pay for a generic (1) to market or co-promote its
product; (2) to provide inventory or backup manufacturing services; (3)
to supply the brand with raw material or with finished drug products; or
(4) for development agreements in the form of up-front payments, mile-
stones, sales percentages, or development fees for unrelated products.
Carrier, Payment After Actavis, supra note 41, at 21 (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade Commission Under the Medicare Pre-
7
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that the settlement was anticompetitive in nature, and therefore violated
the Sherman Act.49  Unfortunately, neither the district court nor the Elev-
enth Circuit found that the FTC had sufficiently alleged an antitrust
violation.50
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the central anti-
trust inquiry was “whether . . . an agreement can sometimes unreasonably
diminish competition in violation of the antitrust laws.”51  The mere fact
that a settlement may be motivated or enabled by the bundle of rights
conferred by a patent does not mean that a settlement cannot violate anti-
trust laws.52  Accordingly, the Court looked to the specific terms of the
settlement, as they are essential to determining its net effect on
competition.53
Upon examining the settlement, the Court found that the reverse
payment settlement sub judice was “large and unjustified,” and therefore
judicially reviewable for an antitrust violation.54  The Court provided five
central justifications for its holding: (1) the settlement could have nega-
tively impacted competition; (2) this negative impact could be unjustified;
(3) the ability to make such a large payment indicates that the patentee
might hold improper market power; (4) such an antitrust action is admin-
istratively feasible; and (5) the settlement could have been structured so as
scription Drug, Improvement, and Modernizations Act of 2003: Summary of
Agreements Filed in FY 2006, 4-5 (2007), available at www.ftc.gov/reports/mmact/
MMAreport2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/NMB9-NLXS]); see C. Scott Hemphill, An
Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competi-
tion, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 664 (2009) (summarizing different types of generic
side deals).
49. See Actavis 570 U.S. at 145 (“According to the FTC the true point of the
payments was to compensate the generics for agreeing not to compete against An-
droGel until 2015.”).
50. See In re Androgel Antitrust Litigation, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1379 (N.D.
Ga. 2010) (dismissing  FTC’s complaint), aff’d, F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677
F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012).
51. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 141 (first citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 (prohibiting arrange-
ments “in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States”); then citing
Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (per curiam)).
52. See id. at 147 (“The agreement’s ‘anticompetitive effects [may] fall within
the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.’  But we do not agree that
that fact . . . can immunize the agreement from antitrust attack.”).  Because a pat-
ent is a necessary exclusionary instrument, there is an inherent tension, at least at
some level, between its effects and the aims of antitrust laws. See United States v.
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 310 (1948) (“The monopoly granted by the patent
laws is a statutory exception to this freedom for competition [called for by the
Sherman Act] and consistently has been construed as limited to the patent
grant.”); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 401 (1948) (noting that
“efforts to monopolize [may occur] through patents as well as in non-patent
fields”).
53. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 154 (noting that “payment in return for staying out
of the market” is potentially problematic).
54. Id. at 158 (noting that “large and unjustified [reverse payment settle-
ments] can bring with [them] the risk of significant anticompetitive effects”).
8
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to avoid liability.55  While all of these concerns are certainly valid, some
commentators have refused to accept them as sufficient to disrupt the set-
tlement process.56
Actavis did not articulate any criterion, other than the rule of reason,
by which reverse payment settlements are to be examined to determine
whether they actually constitute antitrust violations.57  Instead, it explicitly
left it up to the lower courts to determine antitrust violations on an ad hoc
basis.58  The only thing that is clear, is that not every reverse payment set-
tlement will be per se judicially reviewable for an antitrust violation.59
B. Post-Actavis Reverse Payment Settlement Jurisprudence
In the wake of Actavis, courts remain uncertain as to what characteris-
tics a reverse payment settlement must have to render it judicially review-
able for a potential antitrust violation.60  Although some circuits have
interpreted Actavis to reach non-cash settlements, there has been confu-
sion among the lower courts regarding whether a cash payment is re-
quired, especially district courts lacking any binding precedent from their
respective appellate courts.61
55. See id. at 154–58 (outlining “five sets of considerations” that motivated
Court’s holding).  Another primary consideration is that “when . . . [reverse pay-
ment] settlements are made, the validity of [the brand-name manufacturer’s] pat-
ent is in question.”  Fielding, supra note 22, at 1931 (discussing why Actavis Court
refused to examine reverse payment settlements, which induced delayed market
entry, under historical scope of patent approach).
56. See Fischman, supra note 7, at 115 (regarding the majority opinion in Ac-
tavis as the product of any “interdisciplinary misunderstanding”).  Fischman is crit-
ical of Actavis for a number of sophisticated reasons, rooted in economic theory;
among other things, he asserts that Actavis “ignores the interdependence between
the litigants’ settlement and the court’s interference.”  Fischman, supra note 7, at
97.
57. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159–60.  Rather, the Court explicitly refused to
enunciate any specific test (other than the rule of reason test, generally) by which
to examine reverse payment settlements for purposes of antitrust liability stating,
“[w]e therefore leave to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-
reason antitrust litigation.” Id. at 160.
58. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (delegating structuring to lower
courts).
59. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159 (discussing complexities related to reverse pay-
ment settlements bringing about anticompetitive effects); see also Fielding, supra
note 22, at 1933 (noting that “not all reverse [payment] settlements will trigger
antitrust liability”).
60. See Fischman, supra note 7, at 138 n.216.
61. See, e.g., In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 192
(D.R.I. 2014) (reasoning that “Actavis fixates on the one form of consideration that
was at issue in that case: cash”), vacated 814 F.3d 538 (1st Cir. 2016); In re Opana Er
Antitrust Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 704, 718-20 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (finding that plaintiffs
sufficiently pled a large and unjustified settlement).  Fischman takes note of the
Loestrin case, among others, in a footnote explaining that “district courts have
struggled to apply Actavis . . . [specifically that] some courts have applied Actavis
only to reverse payments involving cash, but no other forms of consideration.”
Fischman, supra note 7, at 137–38 n.216 (citing Loestrin, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 192; In re
9
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The First Circuit, for example, has interpreted Actavis to permit judi-
cial review of non-monetary reverse payment settlements.62  Such a non-
monetary settlement might involve “significant forgiveness of debt” or the
release of certain legal claims, rather than merely a large cash payment.63
The Third Circuit has similarly found that non-cash settlements may be
subject to antitrust scrutiny in King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp.64  There, a generic manufacturer and brand-name manufac-
turer entered into a settlement agreement following the invalidation of
one of the brand-name manufacturer’s patent claims.65  As part of the
agreement, the brand-name manufacturer agreed not to manufacturer an
authorized generic, allegedly in exchange for the generic manufacturer de-
laying market entry.66  Despite the defendants’ argument that “only cash
Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 570 (D.N.J. 2014)
(refusing to review non-cash settlement), vacated 791 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2015); c.f.
In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 133 F. Supp.3d 734, 751 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (rea-
soning that “Actavis did outline a specific type of competitive harm”) (emphasis
added).  Although the Supreme Court left the lower courts the task of examining
the factual circumstances surrounding each claimed violation, it was generally con-
cerned with generic manufacturers “abandon[ing] [their] patent claim[s], elimi-
nating the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of invalidity.” Id. (first citing
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156; then citing King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 404 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 446
(2016)).  Accordingly, Actavis was not meant to reach parties who, although they
entered into certain settlement agreements, continued “the underlying patent liti-
gation.” Wellbutrin XL, 133 F. Supp at 750–51.
62. See Am. Sales Co., LLC v. AstraZeneca LP (In re Nexium (Esomeprazole)
Antitrust Litig.), 842 F.3d 34, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting that settlement “in
which a brand name manufacturer effectively overpays a generic manufacturer for
services rendered, may qualify as a reverse payment subject to antitrust scrutiny
and militates against limiting the Supreme Court’s decision to pure cash pay-
ments”(quoting In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litigation, 814 F3d 538, 549 (1st Cir.
2016))).
63. See Am. Sales Co., 842 F.3d at 45–46 (outlining terms of disputed settle-
ment which, although it included a multi-million dollar payment, involved non-
monetary benefits to the generics (citing In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust
Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 231, 286 (D. Mass. 2014))); see also Michael A. Carrier, Sympo-
sium Article: Eight Reasons Why “No Authorized-Generic” Promises Constitute Payment, 67
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 697, 698 (2015) (asserting that non-monetary payments, specif-
ically no-AG agreements, constitute payment under Actavis).
64. 791 F.3d 388, 409 (3d Cir 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016)  (rea-
soning that “noncash nature” of agreement sub judice should not affect the in-
quiry); see also Meghan Fay, The Role of Antitrust Principles in Patent Monopolies: The
Third Circuit Applies Antitrust Scrutiny to No-AG Patent Settlements in SmithKline, 58
B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 128, 143 (2017) (reasoning that Third Circuit “correctly ruled
that no-AG agreements are subject to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason”).
65. See King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 397 (noting that judge found “that the pat-
ent’s main claim, for the invention of [the drug’s active ingredient], was invalid”).
66. See id. at 397 (noting that generic manufacturer would likely have
launched generic drug without an official determination as to validity or non-in-
fringement of brand-name manufacturer’s patent).  An authorized generic “is a
generic drug sold by the company [that] markets the brand name drug.”  Sanofi-
Aventis v. Apotex, Inc., 659 F.3d 1171, 1174–75 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (outlining poten-
tial negative economic effects introduction of authorized generic may have on ge-
10
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payments constitute actionable reverse payments,” the court found that
non-monetary benefits, like the agreement not to market an authorized
generic, could potentially constitute antitrust violations.67
Applying Actavis does not merely involve whether to distinguish cash
and non-cash payments, but it also involves careful application of the fed-
eral pleading requirements.68  Pursuant to the federal fact-pleading re-
quirements, plaintiffs alleging that reverse payment settlements violate
antitrust laws must, at the very least, show that the settlement is not readily
justified by a legitimate explanation.69  Although this requirement can be
rigorously applied to dismiss complaints in the early stages, it ought not be
neric during exclusivity period) (citing Mylan Pharms, Inc. v. United States, 454
F.3d 270, 273 (4th Cir. 2006))).  A “no-AG agreement” constitutes valuable consid-
eration for the generic manufacturer because authorized generics can compete
with traditional generic drugs during the statutorily granted exclusivity period. See
id. at 1175.
67. King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 398 (citing In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686
F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that cash payment might indicate antitrust
violation), vacated 570 U.S. 913 (2013), abrogated by F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S.
136 (2013)).  In King Drug Co., the Third Circuit discussed the effect that Actavis
had on its precedent, namely that it calls for a “full-fledged rule of reason stan-
dard.” King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 398 n.16 (citations omitted); see also Fay, supra
note 64, at 144–46 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (“[T]he SmithKline rul-
ing effectuates the congressional intent to increase competition with the Hatch-
Waxman Act. . . . [and] no-AG agreements represent a large transfer of value that
should be evaluated under the rule of reason.”).
68. See, e.g., In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 549 (1st Cir.
2016) (citing Evergreen Partnering Grp. v. Pactiv Corp., 720 F.3d 33, 46–47 (1st
Cir. 2013)) (noting that strict adherence to Twombly might unfairly prejudice
plaintiffs in antitrust actions). Compare In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig., 754 F.3d
128, 135–36 (2nd Cir. 2014) (“[T]he complaint does little more than attach anti-
trust ‘labels and conclusions’ to what is, at most, an ordinary contract dispute to
which the plaintiffs are not even parties.” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2008))), with In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 233 F. Supp. 3d 247, 261 (D. Mass.
2017) (noting that antitrust plaintiffs alleging existence of monopolistic scheme
“should be given the full benefit of their proof without tightly compartmentalizing
the various factual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each”
(quoting Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 698–99
(1962))).
69. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 871 (Cal. 2015) (“The prima
facie case requires the plaintiff to eliminate the possibility that litigation costs or
other products or services could explain the consideration paid the generic . . . .
[and then] dispel each additional justification the defendants put forward[.]”); see
also supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text (explaining history of reverse pay-
ment settlements and their connection to antitrust scrutiny).  While the Second
Circuit has not expressly held that only cash payments are reviewable under Ac-
tavis, it has applied a seemingly burdensome pleading standard to reverse payment
settlements. See Adderall, 754 F.3d at 135–36 (affirming lower court’s dismissal of
antitrust complaint stemming from settlement).  There, the generic manufactur-
ers, who had yet to obtain ANDA approval, delayed their entry into the market as
part of a settlement agreement. See id. at 130–31 (describing events leading up to
settlement agreement and outlining its terms).
11
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used to require unequivocal proof from antitrust plaintiffs at the pleading
stage.70
IV. IN RE LIPITOR ANTITRUST LITIGATION: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S
FOLLOW-UP APPOINTMENT WITH NON-CASH
REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
The Third Circuit has, once again, weighed in on the judicial review-
ability of reverse payment settlements in litigation stemming from a ge-
neric equivalent for Lipitor.71  The settlement agreement at issue in Lipitor
was subject to review for a potential antitrust violation, and it primarily
concerned non-monetary terms.72  Before discussing the merits and impli-
cations of the Third Circuit’s opinion, the facts and procedure of Lipitor
will be briefly summarized.73
A. Rising Blood Pressure: Facts and Procedure of In re Lipitor
Lipitor is a “brand-name drug” manufactured by Pfizer, and the drug
is “designed to reduce the level of LDL cholesterol in the bloodstream.”74
Pfizer obtained initial patent protection for the active ingredient of Lip-
itor, and this patent protection was subsequently extended until March 24,
2010.75  Pfizer further tried to protect the drug from competition by
claiming additional patent protection for a specific form of its active ingre-
dient.76  While a comprehensive understanding of the exact nature and
scope of these patents may not be necessary to an understanding of the
70. See In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 753 (E.D. Pa. 2014)
(citing In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 341 n.42 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“While it is possible that defendants will be able to supply evidence to rebut plain-
tiffs’ allegations regarding the true value of the [disputed] services . . . [federal
precedent] does not require an antitrust plaintiff to plead facts that, if true, defini-
tively rule out all possible innocent explanations.”).  In Niaspan, the Pennsylvania
Eastern District Court considered a number of factual allegations in holding that
plaintiffs had sufficiently pled their complaints. See Niaspan, 42 F. Supp. 3d at
754–56.  These allegations included, inter alia, the size of the reverse payment, re-
search regarding the likelihood that the generic would have prevailed in the un-
derlying litigation, and the generic’s “willingness to launch at risk” before entering
into the agreement. Id.
71. See generally In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d. 231, 239 (3d Cir. 2018)
(applying Actavis and subjecting settlement to judicial review despite lack of sub-
stantial cash payment).
72. See infra notes 83–84, 97–100 and accompanying text. (noting terms of
disputed settlement agreement).
73. See infra notes 74–89 (summarizing facts and procedure of case)
74. Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 242.  The active ingredient in Lipitor is atorvastatin.
See id. (describing Lipitor’s active ingredient).
75. See id. (summarizing process by which Pfizer sought and obtained patent
protection).
76. See id. (describing additional measures Pfizer undertook to patent specific
ingredient components of Liptor).  Specifically, Pfizer “claimed protection for
atorvastatin calcium, the specific salt form of the active atorvastatin molecule in
Lipitor.” Id.; U.S. Patent No. 5,273,995 (filed Feb. 26, 1991).
12
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case, these aggressive patent strategies evince how Pfizer, like many indus-
try pharmaceutical companies, has tried to maximize its market share.77
In 2002, a generic manufacturer (Ranbaxy) obtained ANDA approval
from the FDA.78  Ranbaxy sought paragraph IV certification, pursuant to
the Hatch-Waxman Act, and that triggered the series of events leading to
the antitrust litigation before the Third Circuit.79  Before Ranbaxy began
distributing its generic, Pfizer sued Ranbaxy for patent infringement
within the statutory window prescribed by the Hatch-Waxman Act.80  The
ensuing litigation yielded a number of different results at different levels,
including the invalidation of certain claims from Lipitor-related patents
held by Pfizer.81  Eventually, in 2008, Pfizer brought suit against Ranbaxy
once again.82
Shortly after the 2008 litigation commenced, Pfizer and Ranbaxy en-
tered into a settlement agreement, which the “plaintiffs allege[d] consti-
tuted an unlawful reverse payment.”83  A key aspect of this settlement was
non-monetary, and involved the release of patent infringement claims that
Pfizer had previously made against Ranbaxy for another pharmaceutical
drug, Accupril.84
The Lipitor direct purchasers and end payors subsequently brought
suit.85  Their separate complaints were consolidated into two “substan-
tively identical claims.”86  First, the plaintiffs claimed that Pfizer violated
Section II of the Sherman Act because the reverse payment settlement
tended to create a monopoly.87  Second, the plaintiffs alleged that the
77. See Sturiale, supra note 11, at 63 (noting practice of preserving weak pat-
ents to maintain market share).
78. See Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 243 (In August 2002, Ranbaxy obtained ANDA
first-filler status for a generic version of Lipitor.”).
79. See id. (noting that paragraph IV certification asserts “that Ranbaxy’s sale,
marketing, or use of generic Lipitor would not infringe any valid Pfizer patent”).
80. See id. (explaining initial steps Pfizer took to block ANDA approval of ge-
neric version of Lipitor).
81. See id. at 243–45 (outlining the various holdings from the Delaware Dis-
trict Court and Federal Circuit).
82. See id. at 244 (“[Pfizer] again sued Ranbaxy . . . claim[ing] that Ranbaxy’s
generic Lipitor would infringe Pfizer’s two Lipitor-related process patents.”).  The
plaintiffs asserted that the 2008 litigation was “a sham because no imminent threat
of harm to Pfizer existed and because Pfizer knew Ranbaxy’s generic would not
violate those patents.” Id.
83. Id. (noting terms of disputed settlement)
84. See id. at 253 (“Pfizer agreed to release the Accupril claims against
Ranbaxy, which were likely to succeed and worth hundreds of millions of dollars,
in exchange for Ranbaxy’s delay in the release of its generic version of Lipitor.”).
85. See id. at 245 (outlining the procedural posture of the case).  The direct
purchasers bought Lipitor directly from the manufacturer, whereas the end payors
acquired Lipitor through intermediaries. See In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust
Litig., 299 F.R.D. 555, 561–62 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (noting that end payors are “final
consumers who absorbed the overcharge passed along the distribution chain”).
86. Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 245 (noting consolidation of claims).
87. See id. (explaining first claim asserted by Plaintiffs); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2
(2018) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
13
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agreement unlawfully restrained trade and therefore violated Section I of
the Sherman Act.88  The district court dismissed both of these claims.89
B. Non-Monetary Advantages Can’t Buy Antitrust Immunity:
Narrative Analysis
In reviewing the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaints,
the Third Circuit began its analysis by outlining how a reverse payment
settlement ought to be examined in light of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Actavis.90  Accordingly, the court noted that reverse payment settle-
ments may give rise to antitrust liability “when the payments are both
‘large and unjustified.’”91  This potentiality for antitrust liability, as estab-
lished by Actavis, departs from the historical “scope of the patent” ap-
proach that generally allowed patent holders broad power to exclude
others from the market.92
Instead, the modern Actavis approach calls for a balancing of rights
granted by a patent against pro-competition policies underlying, and em-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a
felony.”).
88. See Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 245 (noting that plaintiffs “challeng[ed] the settle-
ment agreement as an unlawful restraint of trade.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018)
(providing that, “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal”).
89. See Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 245–46 (citing In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No.
2:12-cv-2389, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126468, at *96–97 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013)
(describing district court’s ruling on Pfizer’s motions to dismiss Lipitor-plaintiffs’
complaints)).
90. See id. at 251-52 (citing F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158-59
(2013)).
91. Id. at 251 (quoting Actavis, 570 U.S. at 158).  The Third Circuit noted that
the Actavis Court sought to “exempt[ ] ‘commonplace forms’ of settlement from
scrutiny.” Id. at 250 (quoting Actavis, 570 U.S. at 152).
92. Id. at 250 (citing Actavis, 570 U.S. at 146) (noting the prior “categorical
rule . . . [which] relied on the premise that, because a patentee possesses a lawful
right to keep others out of its market, the patentee may also enter into settlement
agreements excluding potential patent challengers from entering that market”);
see Fielding, supra note 22, at 1929 (noting that historical scope of patent approach
“originally developed as a device to restrict patentee behavior”).  Fielding notes that
the scope of patent approach originated in the context of “patent tying arrange-
ments, in which the sale of a patented good was conditioned on the concordant
sale of an unpatented good.”  Fielding, supra note 22, at 1929; see also Int’l Salt Co.
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (invoking scope of patent approach to
prevent machine manufacturer from restricting trade of unpatented goods).  The
approach has since been used to insulate manufacturer from antitrust liability, as
noted above, by providing a shield for manufacturers that engage in anticompeti-
tive behavior limited to the disputed product. See Fielding, supra note 23, at 1930
(“[T]he scope of the patent analysis has also been used defensively to immunize
facially anticompetitive agreements from antitrust scrutiny, provided that the
agreements are within the rights conferred by the patent.”).
14
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bodied by, the Sherman Act.93  After establishing that reverse payment
settlements may lead to antitrust violations, the Third Circuit noted that
the plaintiffs could survive dismissal if they have sufficiently pled an im-
proper reverse payment.94  The Third Circuit, having already addressed
the pleading requirements for allegedly improper reverse payment settle-
ments in King Drug Co., noted that non-cash settlements may be improper
under Actavis.95  Simply because a payment is not in cash does not mean
that it cannot be disproportionate.96
Although the agreement did not include an unusually large cash pay-
ment, the Third Circuit found that the agreement was judicially reviewable
as a potential antitrust violation.97  The Third Circuit reasoned that Pfi-
zer’s release of its Accupril claims, which might be worth in excess of $100
million dollars, were unusually large.98  While such a non-monetary bene-
fit might be properly justified by a legitimate explanation, this benefit was
disproportionate to any cognizable benefit in the present case; as such, it
was reasonable to conclude that this considerable non-monetary payment
93. See Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 250 (reasoning that patent rights must be “mea-
sure[ed] . . . against procompetitive antitrust policies” (quoting Actavis, 570 U.S. at
148)).  The tension between patent rights and antitrust laws, which motivated the
adoption of the Hatch-Waxman Act, constantly bubbles beneath the surface of de-
cisions determining the judicial reviewability of reverse payment settlements. See
Fielding, supra note 22, at 1918 (footnote omitted) (“Considering that antitrust
laws are designed to protect competition from monopolistic market power, while
patent law holds out monopolistic power as an incentive to innovate, Hatch-Wax-
man’s balancing of incentives to innovate with opportunities to compete provides
an analytically fertile backdrop against which to evaluate recent antitrust scrutiny
of patent use in the pharmaceutical industry.”).
94. See Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 251–52 (“Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss
when raising an antitrust violation under Actavis, ‘plaintiffs must allege facts suffi-
cient to support the legal conclusion that the settlement at issue involves a large an
unjustified reverse payment under Actavis.’” (quoting In re Loestrin, 814 F.3d 538,
552 (1st Cir. 2016))).
95. See id. at 252 (noting that reverse payment settlements may potentially
violate antitrust laws regardless of whether settlement was “in cash form” (citing
King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 403–09 (3d
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016))); MacDermid Printing Solutions LLC
v. Cortron Corp., 833 F. 3d 172, 185 (2nd Cir. 2016) (reasoning that “settlement of
patent litigation is not immune from possible antitrust liability, [but] neither is it
inherently anticompetitive” (citing F.T.C. v. Actavis Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158–59
(2013))).
96. See Lipitor, 868 F. 3d at 252–53 (noting that an “early-entry provision”
failed to account for non-monetary consideration agreed to by patentee (citing
King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 410)).  An unusually large non-cash payment may, just
like a large cash payment, indicate that the brand-name manufacturer either holds
some improper market power or is concerned about the validity of its patent. See
id. at 251 (citing Actavis, 570 U.S. 136 at 157 (articulating why magnitude of pay-
ment is relevant to determining lawfulness of settlement)).
97. See id. at 253 (noting that plaintiffs “plausibly pled an unlawful reverse
payment settlement agreement”).
98. See id. at 255 (noting that Accupril claims could have succeeded against
Ranbaxy and had tremendous value).
15
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may have been intended to defer Ranbaxy’s entry into the market.99  As
the plaintiffs argued, there was simply no way that the services the generic
manufacturer would provide, in addition to any saved litigation costs, were
commensurate with the release of the Accupril claims.100
Moreover, the Third Circuit went on to criticize the district court’s
dismissal of the complaints for applying an improper, and unduly oner-
ous, pleading standard.101  According to the Third Circuit, the federal
pleading requirements do not require an antitrust plaintiff to engage in a
rigorous and holistic economic analysis of the reverse payment settle-
ment.102  Although plaintiffs must point to specific facts as opposed to
merely reciting legal conclusions, they need not “set out in detail the facts”
that entitle the plaintiff to relief.103  Under this standard, the Lipitor plain-
tiffs sufficiently pled a potential antitrust violation.104  The Third Circuit
99. See id. at 256 (noting that settlement may properly be justified by “avoid-
ing litigation costs, providing payment for services, or other consideration” (citing
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156)).
100. See Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 253–54 (“Despite the large expected damages aris-
ing from the Accupril suit and the high likelihood of its success, Pfizer subse-
quently released its Accupril claims as part of a settlement agreement with
Ranbaxy . . . Lipitor plaintiffs allege that the release of the Accupril claims was unjus-
tified, as the release of the potential liability in Accupril ‘far exceeded’ any of Pfi-
zer’s saved litigation costs or any services provided by Ranbaxy.”) (internal
citations omitted).  Because there was no reasonable (or legitimate) explanation
for this disparity, the Court was sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ argument that this
massive compensation was meant to induce a delayed entry into the market by
Ranbaxy. See id. (describing Court’s reaction to plaintiffs’ argument); Carrier, Pay-
ment After Actavis, supra note 41, at 19 (reasoning that “Actavis recognized two cate-
gories for which the settling parties could offer justifications . . . the payment (1) is
no larger than litigations costs; or (2) is for unrelated generic services rather than
delayed entry.”).  Carrier similarly notes that it is incumbent upon the “settling
parties . . . [to] show that their payment is in fact for unrelated services.”  Carrier,
Payment After Actavis, supra note 41, at 25.
101. See Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 254 (reasoning that district court applied “a
heightened pleading standard contrary to Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 [2007] . . . and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 [2009]”).  “).  The Court in
Twombly required that plaintiffs plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007).  Similarly, the Court in Iqbal reasoned that plaintiffs must support legal
conclusions with specific facts to avoid dismissal. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678–79 (2009).
102. See Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 255 (refusing to apply any “special valuation re-
quirement” to antitrust plaintiffs).
103. Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 254 (first quoting Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of Ap-
proved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013) (interpreting federal
pleading requirements); then quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3).
104. See id. at 255 (noting that “the Supreme Court in Actavis was deliberately
opaque about the parameters of reverse payment antitrust claims”).  The Third
Circuit went on to criticize the onerous pleading standard applied by the lower
court (and argued for by the defendants): “The Supreme Court [in Actavis] did
not require the advanced valuations asked for by Lipitor defendants and required
by the District Court.” Id.; see also In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538,
541 (1st Cir. 2016) (“Consistent with Twombly, which declined to ‘require height-
ened fact pleading of specifics’ [in an antitrust suit], we do not require that the
16
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refused to require any “special valuation requirement,” and instead rea-
soned that the non-monetary payment was sufficiently disproportionate
“to permit a plausible inference” that Pfizer was improperly wielding its
patents to monopolize the market.105
In summary, the Third Circuit found that the plaintiffs’ allegations
were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.106  The complaints detailed
a reverse payment settlement that was unusually large and evidently unjus-
tified by any legitimate explanation.107  Put otherwise, the plaintiffs could
not point to any legitimate explanation for the settlement, and, in re-
sponse, the defendants failed to explain away this apparent lack of
justification.108
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: A TOUGH PILL TO SWALLOW FOR
BRAND-NAME MANUFACTURERS
The Third Circuit’s decision seemingly increases the scope of judicial
scrutiny of reverse payment settlements for two reasons.109 First, the
plaintiffs provide precise figures and calculations at the pleading stage.” (first quot-
ing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; then quoting In re Actos End Payor Antitrust Litig.,
No. 13-cv-9244, 2015 WL 5610752, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2015) (explaining why
defendants’ arguments were rejected))).
105. Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 255 (reasoning that “Pfizer [might have] possessed
the power to bring about an unjustified anticompetitive harm through its patents
and had serious doubts about the ability of those patents to lawfully prevent com-
petition” (citing Actavis, 570 U.S. 136 at 156-57)).
106. See id. at 256 (reasoning that plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient “at this
juncture”).
107. See id. (“To plausibly allege an unjustified reverse payment, an antitrust
payment need only allege the absence of a ‘convincing justification’ for the pay-
ment.” (quoting Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159)).
108. See id. at 257 (“An antitrust defendant may show in the antitrust proceed-
ing that legitimate justifications are present, thereby explaining the presence of
the challenged term and showing the lawfulness of that term under the rule of
reason.” (quoting Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156)).  Under this view, there is an aspect of
burden-shifting; once the plaintiffs suggest that a reverse payment settlement is
suspect, it becomes the defendants’ burden to justify this apparent impropriety.
See id. (“The Supreme Court clearly placed the onus of explaining or justifying a
large reverse payment on antitrust defendants.”).  The Lipitor defendants attempted
to justify the magnitude of the reverse payment settlement, “contend[ing] that the
reverse payment . . . was no more than a commonplace settlement.” Id. at 257.
The Third Circuit, however, found the “argument [to be] unpersuasive.” Id.  The
opinion went on to delineate between actual “ ‘commonplace forms’ of settlement,
such as tender by an infringer of less than the patentee’s full demand” and settle-
ments like the one sub judice, which the Court viewed as “a token payment by the
purportedly infringing generic manufacturer.” Id. at 257–58 (first quoting King
Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 402 (3d
Cir. 2014); then quoting Actavis, 570 U.S. at 152).  In rejecting the defendants’
arguments, the Court reemphasized that plaintiffs are entitled to all “reasonable
inferences arising [from their plausible allegations].” Id. at 258.
109. See Rich Samp, Third Circuit Antitrust Decision Makes Pharmaceutical Patent
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Third Circuit has reaffirmed its prior determination that non-cash pay-
ments are reviewable under Actavis.110  Second, the court advocated a
seemingly plaintiff-friendly pleading standard for such antitrust actions,
because its approach explicitly shifts the burden to antitrust defendants to
provide justifications for the reverse payment settlement.111
Placing non-cash settlements within the purview of Actavis is ostensi-
bly emerging as the norm among federal courts that have ruled on the
issue.112  Although some district courts have refused to extend Actavis to
non-cash payments, appellate courts have overturned these decisions.113
Additionally, commentators have provided strong justifications as to why
all reverse payment settlements, even those where no cash is exchanged,
can still violate antitrust laws; as one commentator has observed, “[i]t does
not make economic sense to preclude antitrust scrutiny when a brand,
instead of paying with cash, pays with another form of consideration.”114
If Actavis is meant to protect consumers from potentially monopolistic be-
ma.cc/P2DA-JX3F] (arguing that Lipitor wrongly extended Actavis to apply to non-
monetary disputes).  Samp is sharply critical of the Third Circuit’s decision: “The
Third Circuit’s advocacy of antitrust criteria that would halt virtually all future
drug-patent litigation cannot be squared with Actavis, given that decision’s stated
intent to create a standard under which settlements could still flourish.” Id.
110. See Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 252–53 (noting that “reverse payment underlying
an Actavis claim need not be in cash form” (citing King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc.
v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 403-09 (3d Cir. 2015)); see also supra
notes 64–67 and accompanying text (explaining facts and holding of King Drug
Co.).
111. See Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 256–57 (noting antitrust defendants’ burden of
explaining ostensibly unjustified settlements); see also supra notes 106–08 and ac-
companying text (summarizing Lipitor’s holding).
112. See supra notes 61–67 (summarizing relevant judicial standards applied
to reverse settlement payment analyses and outlining decisions of other courts rul-
ing on same issue); see also Fay, supra note 64, at 145-46 (reasoning that interpret-
ing Actavis as limited to cash payments “would disservice Actavis and allow
pharmaceutical drug manufacturers to creatively avoid antitrust scrutiny by disguis-
ing valuable compensation through non-cash means”).
113. See, e.g., In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 180, 192 (D.R.I.
2014), vacated 814 F.3d 538 (1st Cir. 2016); see also supra notes 59–64 and accompa-
nying text (listing Loestrin and other district court decisions that have been vacated
by their appellate courts).
114. Carrier, supra note 63, at 716.  Carrier provides eight interrelated justifi-
cations as to why a no-AG agreement, specifically, constitutes payment under Ac-
tavis. See id. at 706–19.  These eight justifications are as follows: (1) the text of
Actavis focused on overpayment and proportionality, rather than explicitly men-
tioning cash; (2) the facts of Actavis involved disproportionate payments for “ge-
neric services;” (3) a no-AG clause can have tremendous cash-value; (4) a no-AG
clause is disproportionate to legal costs; (5) no-AG clauses have “brand” value; (6)
refusing to incorporate non-cash payments would be overly formalistic; (7) the
“threat[ ] to introduce an AG” is coercive; and (8) “no-AG pledges present a form
of market division.” Id. at 706–09 (citations and footnotes omitted).  Although
Carrier’s analysis is anchored in a specific form of non-monetary consideration,
non-AG agreements, his reasoning is similarly applicable to other non-cash forms
of consideration. See id.  For a further discussion of non-cash forms of considera-
tion, see supra note 39.
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havior, then its applicability should not hinge on the “formalistic” distinc-
tion between cash and non-cash.115
The Third Circuit may, however, extend some of the Actavis Court’s
plaintiff-friendly language a bit too far.116  A key aspect of the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision was its reasoning that “an antitrust plaintiff need only allege
the absence of a ‘convincing justification’ for the payment.”117  While the
Third Circuit correctly noted that the absence of a convincing justification
is a factor in determining the judicial reviewability of reverse payment set-
tlements, it is merely one factor.118  By appreciating the burden that anti-
trust plaintiffs must satisfy in order to survive a motion for summary
judgment, the Third Circuit may have, either inadvertently or intention-
ally, tipped the scales in favor of the plaintiffs’ bar; this may result in an
increased number of settlements that satisfy, at least at the early stages of
litigation, the large and unjustified standard enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Actavis.119
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit may be rightly attempting to shine a
light on surreptitious practices by large pharmaceutical companies that
suppress competition.120  The simple fact remains that many of these
agreements may have been intentionally aimed at maintaining a monop-
115. Carrier, supra note 63, at 715–16 (reasoning that antitrust holding
should depend on “demonstrable economic effect rather than . . . formalistic line
drawing” (quoting Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58–59
(1977))).
116. Compare In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231, 256–57 (3d Cir. 2017)
(reasoning that Actavis clearly places burden on defendants to justify payment by
proffering legitimate justifications), with F.T.C. v. Actavis, 570 U.S. 136, 156 (2013)
(noting that “possibility” of traditional or fair settlement “does not justify dis-
miss[al]”).  The Third Circuit’s opinion follows logically from Actavis, but the opin-
ion also uses more explicit and plaintiff-friendly language than Actavis. See Lipitor,
868 F.3d at 256–57.
117. Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 256 (quoting Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159).
118. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159 (noting that absence of a convincing justifica-
tion is one of many factors that should be considered).  The excerpted language
used by the Court in Actavis comes from a paragraph detailing the multi-layered
nature of the analysis: “[T]he likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about an-
ticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s antici-
pated future litigation costs, its independence from other services for which it
might represent payment, and the lack of any other convincing justification.” Id.
(emphasis added).
119. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 871 (Cal. 2015) (discussing
parties’ respective burdens throughout litigation process).  Regardless of whether
the Third Circuit’s standard actually constitutes a lower, or less computationally
intensive pleading standard, the plaintiff will always have the ultimate burden of
proof. See id. at 871 (“The ultimate burden throughout [the litigation] rests with
the plaintiff to show that a challenged settlement agreement is anticompetitive.”
(citing Bert G. Gianelli Distributing Co. v. Beck & Co., 172 Cal.App.3d 1020, 1048
(Cal. App. 1985))).
120. See Prince, supra note 13, at 693 (regarding reverse payment settlements
as tool “to keep . . . weak patents intact and stifle generic competition by paying
competitors to delay entry of their lower-cost alternatives”); see also supra notes
97–98 and accompanying text.
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oly over a certain aspect of the pharmaceutical market so as to enable
monopoly pricing.121  As commentators have pointed out, brand-name
manufacturers often charge outrageous prices for their brand-name drugs
when they have an exclusive market share.122
VI. POTENTIAL SIDE EFFECTS: CONCLUSION
The Lipitor decision has undoubtedly increased the scope of judicial
review of reverse payment settlements for antitrust violations, at least in
the Third Circuit.123  As a direct result, both brand-name manufacturers
and generic manufacturers must take care that they craft fair settlements,
regardless of whether a large sum of cash is being exchanged.124  Put oth-
erwise, there must be some valuable consideration contributed by the ge-
neric manufacturers rather than some sham or token consideration in
addition to delayed entry into the market.125
Moreover, there is an emerging consensus that any valuable consider-
ation can constitute an antitrust violation, regardless of whether the settle-
ment involves the exchange of massive amounts of cash.126  From a policy
perspective, this might be a step in the right direction of promoting fur-
ther competition among brand-name and generic manufacturers; when
121. See Carrier, supra note 60, at 719 (“Like all anticompetitive market-alloca-
tion agreements, the reciprocal pledges [involved in reverse payment settlements]
increase the parties’ joint profits at the expense of consumers, who pay higher
prices than they otherwise would . . . .”); see also Prince, supra note 13, at 694
(reasoning that reverse payment settlements have a “staggering” impact on
consumers).
122. See Prince, supra note 13, at 694 (noting that “price of a generic drug . . .
can drop more than 90% below what the brand-name drug company was able to
initially charge with full market exclusivity”).  Although Prince roots his analysis in
South Carolina state law, he points out a number of valid concerns that support a
liberal construction of Actavis so as to protect consumers from monopolistic pric-
ing. See id. (discussing costs associated with limited access to generic drugs).
123. See In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231, 255–58 (3d Cir. 2017) (ap-
plying federal pleading requirements and reasoning that plaintiffs sufficiently al-
leged an unjustified settlement under Actavis); see also supra notes 116–19 and
accompanying text (describing Third Circuit’s scope of review of reverse settle-
ment payments based on its interpretation of Supreme Court precedent).
124. See Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 257–58 (distinguishing settlement sub judice from
“commonplace settlement” that ought not be subjected to judicial review); see also
supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (explaining Third Circuit’s reasoning
for subjecting settlement agreement in Lipitor to judicial review even though it did
not include a substantial amount of cash).
125. See Lipitor, 868 F.3d at 258 (noting insignificant value of services generic
manufacturer agreed to supply as part of settlement); see also supra notes 92–95
and accompanying text (noting that Third Circuit focused on “disproportionate”
settlement agreement between generic manufacturer and Pfizer).
126. See, e.g., Am. Sales Co., LLC v. AstraZeneca LP (In re Nexium (Es-
omeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 842 F.3d 34, 41–42 (1st Cir. 2016) (refusing to limit
Actavis to cash payments); see also supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing post-Actavis jurisprudence interpreting what makes settlement large and
unjustified).
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reverse payment settlements are increasingly likely to result in expensive
antitrust litigation, they become decreasingly attractive to brand-name
manufacturers.127  If one considers that the real goal of antitrust legisla-
tion and antitrust common law is to promote competition, then non-cash
settlements with potentially anticompetitive effects ought to be within the
reach of Actavis.128
Nevertheless, reverse payment settlements are often attractive options
for all parties to the patent litigation.129  As such, a pro-pharmaceutical
stance might chastise the Third Circuit for chilling companies from engag-
ing in amicable settlements that make pragmatic sense for each involved
party.130  Parties must, however, ensure that these settlements are mutu-
ally advantageous and proportional, and that they are not merely obfuscat-
ing anticompetitive intentions.131  If, however, parties refuse to engage in
permissible settlements, it is unclear how and whether courts could force
litigation among parties that have otherwise resolved their dispute.132
A great deal of uncertainty continues to surround the scope of Actavis
and its application to non-cash settlements.133  Questions continue to per-
sist as to how rigorous a pleading standard ought to apply to antitrust
plaintiffs complaining of improper reverse payment settlements.134  One
127. See Fay, supra note 64, at 146 (noting that increased scrutiny of settle-
ments may ultimately benefit consumers); see also supra notes 60–64, 109 and ac-
companying text (noting expanded scope of judicial review of reverse settlement
payments in context of antitrust violations and justifications in support of this ex-
panded scope).
128. See Fay, supra note 64, at 144–46 (reasoning that subjecting non-cash set-
tlement to antitrust scrutiny is consistent with aims of Hatch-Waxman Act and anti-
trust principles); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text (quoting Section I of
Sherman Act, which prohibits business activities that restrain trade).
129. Amy C. Waltz, Note, Closing the Deal: Making the Right Congressional Deci-
sion About Patent Settlement Agreements, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 155, 157 (2008) (ex-
plaining advantages afforded to both brand-name and generic manufacturer when
they engage in settlement agreement).
130. See id. at 168–73 (advancing arguments in support of litigants’ right to
engage in efficient settlements to avoid costly and uncertain litigation); see also
note 8 and accompanying text (noting pragmatic benefits of settlement parties
involved in patent litigation).
131. See In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231, 257–58 (3d Cir. 2017) (not-
ing disparity between anticipated litigation costs and value of released claims); see
also supra note 108 and accompanying text (noting that Third Circuit denied de-
fendants’ argument, finding reverse settlement agreement to be “token
payment”).
132. See Fischman, supra note 7, at 105 (noting that extensive judicial review
will discourage settlements).
133. For a further discussion of uncertainties surrounding the scope of Ac-
tavis, see supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text (outlining various courts’
views on required pleading standards).
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thing is, however, certain; pursuant to the mandates of the Actavis Courts,
the common law must continue to interpret and define the bounds of
Actavis and its progeny.135
135. See F.T.C. v. Actavis, 570 U.S. 136, 160 (2013) (leaving interpretation of
rule of reason as to reverse payment settlements to lower courts).
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